# Reverse Auctions to Scale Renewable Energy: Brazilian Approach



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Renewable Energy Auctions
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
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# Brazil at a glance



#### Interconnected System – Map 2015



# **Main Figures**

#### **Brazil**

	Area	8,514,876 Km <sup>2</sup>
-	Population	206 million
	GDP 2016	US\$1.9 trillion*
	GDP 2016 per capita	115\$ 9 330*

### **Electricity Sector**

•	Transmission lines	128,000 Km		
	Generation Capacity	152.1 GW		
	• Hydro	64,74%		
	<ul> <li>Thermal</li> </ul>	27,7%		
	• Wind	6,15%		
	<ul> <li>Nuclear</li> </ul>	1,39%		
	<ul> <li>Solar PV</li> </ul>	0,02%		

# Consumption 537 TWh


•	Regulated Market	76%
•	Free Market	24%

<sup>\*</sup> Exchange rate Dec 31, 2016:R\$ 3,2591/USD 1,00

# Generation




**152.1 GW Installed Capacity:** Renewables represent approx. 79% of Brazilian electricity mix



# **Sector Governance**



Power Sector Governance gives autonomy to the Regulatory Agency in order to avoid political influence.



# **Dimensions in a Power Auction**




#### Three Dimensions in a Power Auction



# **Market Design**



# Evolution of Renewables (RES-E) in Brazil Small Hydro, Wind, Solar PV and Biomass



# **Market Design**



# **Regulatory Framework**

Tailored regulation created a dynamic market in Brazil



RES-E power plants and their consumers are rewarded with discounts on grid tariffs. Biomass, Small Hydro and Wind attracts a 50% discount. Solar PV plants commissioned prior to 2017 are rewarded with an 80% discount, and after 2018 the discount is 50%.



Auctions with specific design characteristics foster RES-E, including contracts indexed to Consumer Price Index and special settlement rules accommodating generation variability.




Subsidized loans to manufacturers, that abide by Local Content Rules, led to a rapid growth of domestic supply chain. However, the recent economic crisis (2014-2016) ran down BNDES resources and a roll back of this policy has been realized by investors since the beginning of 2016.

# **Auction Process**



# **Auction Process**

Main steps




# **Auction Process**



# How are auctions operated in Brazil?

# Summary of Brazilian auctions



FEC = Firm Energy Certificate

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# **Auction Design**



# **Auction Design for Regulated Market**

Features for fostering RES-E



# **Exclusive Products**

- The Government designs auctions with specific RES-E products
- Price caps are set according to the technology's characteristics



# Variable Costs Ceiling

 Even in auctions with multi-products, there is a tough Variable Cost Ceilling that harms fossil fuel plants, especially high polluting ones



# Tailored PPAs

- Long-term
   PPAs indexed
   by Consumer
   Price Index
- Generation settlement with a variability range that mitigates investors' risks

# **Auction Summary**



# **Fact Sheet of Brazilian Auctions (1/3)**

Item	Description			
Why auctions?	Auctions are competitive mechanisms that allow price discovery and can foster new technologies, especially if there is a legal and regulatory framework.			
The Buyers	Regulted Auctions: Utility companies that need to cover their loads Reserve Energy: CCEE with the goal of improving Supply Adequacy.			
Sellers	Independent Producers technically certified by EPE and with bid bonds deposited on CCEE.			
Forward Period	New Energy Auctions: 3 to 7 years Existing Energy: 1 to 5 years Renewables tend to participate in 3 year forward auctions			
Delivery Period	Hydro: 30 years; Micro Hydro, Wind, Solar PV and Biomass: 20 years			

# **Auction Summary**



# Fact Sheet of Brazilian Auctions (2/3)

Item	Description			
Sellers Obligation	Winning bidders are contracted to build the power plant on time, deliver the electricity, and supply the contracted amount. Wind and Solar PV have special settlement terms to accommodate generation variability. Penalties are applied on the generation deficit (Wind and Solar PV have a 15% penalty when the deficit is higher than 10%)			
Sellers Financial Guarantees	<b>Bid Bond:</b> 1% of the investment to build the power plant <b>Performance Bond:</b> 5% of the investment			
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Guarantee	Regulated Auctions: There is a financial guarantee contract that allows the bank to make a direct transfer from Utilities' bank account to generator's account, avoiding Utilities discretionary management.  Reserve Energy: CCEE has a fund equivalent to 1.5 times the total amount needed to pay all generators for a month; CCEE also uses the settlement of electricity produced to reduce the collection of surcharges from consumers.			

# **Auction Summary**



# Fact Sheet of Brazilian Auctions (3/3)

Item	Description			
Role of each entity	Auction characteristics: Ministry of Mines and Energy - MME  Certification and Technical Studies: Energy Research Office – EPE Regulation: National Regulatory Agency – ANEEL Operation and Contract Management: Market Operator - CCEE Grid Access: National Grid Operator - ONS			
Environmental licenses	Licenses are obtained from the Federal Ministry of Environment when a river supplying a hydro facility crosses more than one state; Licenses are obtained from the applicable State Agencies for all the other projects.			
Time to Organize one auction	It generally takes 4 to 5 months to undertake an auction. However, the legal and regulatory framework took 2 years to be created (2003-2004), and the first auction took 7 months.			



#### **Auctions Results**


Dec-2004 to Apr-2017

Type of auction	Qty	Cld	No Trading	With Trading	USD Billion	Electricity (TWh)
New Energy	23	2		21	295.3	4,656.895
Existing Energy	16	1	2	13	72.5	1,598.558
Adjust Auction	18	2	3	13	2.16	23.367
Reserve Energy	11	1	1	9	47.5	722.932
Alternative Sources	3			3	11.78	176.941
Structuring Projects	3			3	58.6	1,522.811
Total	74	6	6	62	487.84	8,701.504

Note: Prices in Reais were updated by inflation rate from the auction day to Apr, 2017. Then, prices are converted into USD with Exchange Rate R\$ 3.28 / USD. It differs from prices in USD on the auction day due to Exchange Rate variability.











# **Contracted Energy in Supply Adequacy Auctions**

aMW in Firm Energy Certificates – by Technology






# Contracted Energy by Technology in Supply Adequacy Auctions Long-term evolution – aMW FEC and BRL/MWh





# Prices by Technology USD/MWh



Note: Prices in Reais were updated by inflation rate from the auction day until Apr, 2017. Then the prices are converted into USD with Exchange Rate R\$ 3.28 / USD. It differs from prices in USD on the auction day due to Exchange Rate variability.

# **Renewable Auction Lessons**



#### **Learned Lessons**



**Contract:** Brazil created contracts with special features for Renewables, including Settlement rules to accommodate generation variability of wind and solar PV.



**Financial Guarantees:** Players demand that off-takers are creditworthy. It is a cornerstone to the success of an auction.



**Bid Mechanism:** Electronic platforms and bid mechanism increased the competition and got expressive price reductions per MWh. We used a descending clock mechanism on 2004-2016 period and this year we are starting the tests with continuous trading methodology.



Introduction of new technologies: Well designed auctions attract new players and introduce technologies. Wind is a good example, before the commencement of auctions the Installed Capacity was lower than 1 GW and currently it is 10.5 GW.

# **Renewable Auction Lessons**



#### **Pitfalls**



**Cancelling auctions near to date:** In 2016 Brazil made the decision of organizing an auction even with a surplus of contracts and on the eve of the auction decided to cancel the procurement.



Construction and No-Completion Rates: The delay rate is around 27.3% and the No-Completion rate is 10%. At the end the most of power plants are built but we have many administrative and legal disputes on the process, especially about the accountability of penalties (i.e. Environmental licenses, manufacturers delays).



**Generation and Transmission mismatch:** We decided to speed up the auctions for Wind between 2010-2013; however, the power plants were completed before the transmission lines. The responsibility of this mismatch laid with the State and at the end it cost the consumers about USD 1 billion.


# Conclusion



#### Conclusion

There is no "one size fits all"

- Reverse power auctions are powerful tools to promote the Supply Adequacy and to scale up renewables, as well.
- The auction should be carefully organized in order to assure the transparency and fairness of the process.
- Auction design matters, but it is not enough to correct market and regulatory failures.
- There is no "one size fits all" approach. Each market (country) is unique; it is necessary to adopt a specific approach with the goal to increase the efficiency of the auction.



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# **Anexus**



- I. Market Design
- **II. Financial Guarantees for Regulated Market Auctions**

# **Market Design**



# **Brazilian Market Design**

Wholesale Competition with a tight pool dispatch Reserve Energy is contracted in a Single Buyer approach

#### Sellers:

Generators, IPPs, Traders and Self-Generators.



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#### Regulated Market:

Distributors
Companies (DISCOS)
supplying captive
consumers.

Auctions and Quotes (Old Hydro Power Plants, Itaipu and Nuclear Plants Angra I-II)

#### Free Market:

Free Consumers, Special Consumers, Traders

Over the Counter and Power Exchanges

# Sellers: Generators, IPP



#### Reserve Energy:

Amount defined by MME in order to increase supply security. Its is paid by a surcharge over all loads.

**Auctions** 


# **Financial Guarantees**



# Winners sign direct contracts

Pool contracting

Winners sign direct bilateral contracts with the Distributors, despite the centralized auction. Amounts are divided in several contracts by the proportion of Distributions' needs declared to MME. (Pool Contracting scheme).




# **Financial Guarantees**



# Winners sign direct contracts

Attached to PPA there is a contract called Guarantee Contract (CCG in Portuguese).



# **Financial Guarantees**



# **Contract's Financial Guarantee**

